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Abstract
In response to the Great Recession, Central Banks around the world adopted “unconven-
tional” monetary policies. In particular, the Fed, and more recently the ECB, launched
massive debt monetization programs. In this paper, we develop a formal analysis of the
short- and long-run consequences of deficit and debt monetization, through an endoge-
nous growth model in which economic growth interacts with productive public expen-
diture. This interaction can generate two positive balanced growth paths (BGP) in the
long-run: a high BGP and a low BGP, and further, depending on the form of the CIA
constraint, possible multiplicity and indeterminacy. Thus, monetizing deficits is found
to be remarkably powerful. First, a large dose of monetization might allow avoiding,
whenever present, BGP indeterminacy. Second, monetization always allows increasing
growth and welfare along the (high) BGP, by weakening the debt burden in the long-run.
Third, with a CIA on consumption only, monetization provides a rationale for deficits
in the long-run: for high degrees of monetization, the impact of deficits and debts on
economic growth and welfare becomes positive in the steady-state.
1. Introduction
The Great Recession shaped the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies in an un-
precedented way. On the monetary side, on October the 8th 2008 several major Central
Banks (Canada, England, ECB, Fed, Sweden, and Switzerland) implemented a coordi-
nated reduction in policy interest rates, in an attempt for providing a global monetary
easing. On the fiscal side, governments of most developed countries launched massive
debt-financed spending programs, which might have generated explosive debt paths: for
example, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States rose from 65% in 2007 to
around 102% in 2014, and from 66% to 91% in the Eurozone.
However, these efforts failed to restore economic growth, which remains mild in most
developed countries, and particularly in the Eurozone. In a context of high public debt
1Univ.Orle´ans, CNRS, LEO, UMR7322, FA45067, Orle´ans,France.
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burden, the space for further increases in public spending financed by fiscal deficits is
limited. Besides, given the decline of interest rates close to the zero bound, interest-rate-
based policies are ineffective. Thus, policymakers need to draw upon alternative policies.
So far, only monetary policy seems to have met this challenge: given the presence of
historically low rates, many Central Banks recently launched “unconventional” policies,
particularly in the form quantitative easing. For example, while the Fed bought an
unprecedented amount of public and private debt to keep rates low,3 the ECB collected
the equivalent of 210 billion euros (around 2.2% of the Eurozone GDP) in bonds, mainly
as collateral in refinancing facilities. Moreover, the statement of Mario Draghi (President
of the ECB, on July 26th, 2012) that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to
preserve the euro”, suggested at that time that the ECB could buy Eurozone sovereign
debt, despite its institutional arrangement prohibiting monetizing debt or directly buying
Government bonds. Such a decision was indeed adopted on January 23rd 2015, as the
ECB decided for 1.1 trillion bond-buying.
Consequently, the age of Central Banks “independence” (from fiscal policy) and of
monetary policy isolationism seems to be over (see, e.g. Taylor, 2012). Even if the
question of monetizing public debt and deficits never has disappeared from the theoretical
perspective,4 this question comes back into the spotlight of the policy debate, fueled by
several discussions.
First, as regards current economic conditions, several Eurozone countries experience
very high public debt ratios (Greece and Italy) or rapidly growing debt paths (Ireland
and Spain, and, to some extent, France). This raised concerns about their capacity to
continue servicing their debts, particularly in an environment of low economic growth.5
As such, Paris & Wyplosz (2014) concluded that the only realistic way for fiscally-sunk
(i.e. debt-to-GDP ratios above 100%) Eurozone countries to escape default is to sell
monetized debt to the ECB. According to these authors, the ECB should “bury the
debt forever”, by restructuring 50% of sovereign debts, a plan that they qualify to be
“politically acceptable”.6 Effectively, in history, the liquidation of public debt mainly
occurred through defaults or monetization (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008).
Second, beyond the issue of restructuring the existing stocks of public debt, a related
question concerns the monetization of new sovereign debts, namely public deficits. In this
3Between 2008 and 2013, the Fed diverted around 1 trillion USD for buying US government bonds
(however, the extent to which this could be considered as debt monetization is subject to debate, see
Thornton, 2010, or Andolfatto & Li, 2013).
4The proponents of the “fiscal theory of the price level”, for example, show that, if current public
debt is fully covered by money creation, namely, by seigniorage revenues, the general level of prices is
not independent of the stock of public debt (see Aiyagari & Gertler, 1985, Leeper, 1991, or Woodford,
1994). In this paper, the price level will be determined by the quantity of money, but the inflation rate
will closely be related to debt emissions, as in Sargent & Wallace (1981).
5From a wider perspective, the crisis fractured the Eurozone between “North” and “South” countries,
and observers now insist on the need for debt monetization, not only in periphery countries but also in
larger ones. Indeed, even if Greece could be bailed out by other Eurozone countries, this would not be
feasible for the much larger public debts of Italy, Spain, or France.
6In addition, Giavazzi & Tabellini (2014) state that “fiscal expansion without monetary easing would
be almost impossible, because public debt in circulation is already too high in many countries” , and
defend the issuance of 30-years maturity public debt to be financed by the ECB. Relatedly, several
recent contributions revisit debt monetization from the perspective of the famous “helicopter money”
parabola, as coined by Friedman (1948, 1969). Reichlin et al. (2013), Turner (2013) and Buiter (2014)
all make the case for debt monetization.
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respect, as regards the institutional design of the Eurozone, monetization is advocated
within institutional reforms packages. According to De Grauwe (2013) “Ideally, the euro
zone would combine a symmetrical budget policy with debt monetization by the ECB” , in
such a manner that low-deficit countries like Germany would run a more expansionary
fiscal policy and share the burden of the adjustment in the periphery of the Eurozone.
Third, the main argument against deficit monetization, namely the additional infla-
tion it may create, (following Sargent & Wallace, 1981’s “unpleasant monetarist arith-
metic”) does not seem to be so relevant in depressed economies and in the presence of
liquidity traps that disconnect inflation from the money stock. As such, deficit mone-
tization could affect inflation only marginally,7 and would even allow avoiding deflation
and its possibly harmful effects on growth (see Muellbauer & Aron, 2008, or Blanchard,
2014).
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical work for assessing the
impact of such a public deficit monetization on economic growth in the short- and in the
long-run. For example, in a DSGE model, Gali (2014) finds that a money-financed fiscal
stimulus improves output in the short-run, if rigidities are at work. In this case, money-
financed public spending might dominate debt-financed public spending as regards their
short-run growth and welfare effects. Nevertheless, his analysis is limited to wasteful
exogenous public spending and focuses on the short-run, without formally studying deficit
monetization. Another example is Buiter (2014), who suggests in an OLG model that
in high-debt contexts monetizing a fiscal stimulus might be the preferred strategy, but
without precisely address the question of deficit monetization.
To establish more formal results on the long- and short-run effects of monetization,
we study in this paper the impact of monetizing public deficits in an endogenous growth
model with permanent public indebtedness. In order to give a role for public expendi-
ture, we model endogenous growth from the canonical model of Barro (1990) with public
spending entering the production function as a flow of “productive” services. In addition,
we introduce a general budget constraint for the Government, in which public expendi-
tures can be financed both by taxes and public indebtedness. To introduce money, we rest
on a standard “cash-in-advance” (hereafter CIA) specification, in which the demand for
money is generated by the need of a liquid asset to finance either consumption goods only
or both consumption and investment goods. Contrary to the usual assumption, in which
money supply is modeled as exogenous, we suppose that money creation is proportional
to fiscal deficits. This allows analyzing the impact of the degree of deficit-monetization,
which in the long-run corresponds to monetizing a share of public debt.
Our findings are twofold. First, as regards the balanced growth path (hereafter BGP),
our model exhibits a multiplicity of steady-states, namely, a high BGP and a low BGP,
with the following intuitive explanation. The rate of economic growth positively depends
on public expenditure, which increases the marginal productivity of private capital. In
addition, public expenditure is an increasing function of economic growth in the Govern-
ment budget constraint, because growth allows reducing the debt burden in the long-run.
This dual positive interaction between economic growth and public expenditure generates
multiplicity. High economic growth allows reducing the impact of the debt burden, and
boosts growth-enhancing productive expenditure. However, low economic growth gives
7Turner (2013) defends debt monetization on the grounds of current non-inflationary growth perspec-
tives.
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rise to an increase in public debt, with an associated crowding-out effect on productive
public spending, which, in turn, has an adverse effect on growth. Moreover, we show that
the low BGP positively depends on deficits, whatever the degree of monetization. On the
contrary, the high BGP is negatively affected by public deficits if monetization is “low”,
but can be positively affected if monetization is “high”. Furthermore, independently of
the effect of deficits, monetization is shown to increase economic growth and welfare in
the long-run along the high BGP.
Second, as regards transitional dynamics, results change dramatically depending on
the nature of the CIA constraint. If only consumption is subject to the constraint,
the high BGP is saddle-point stable and the low BGP is unstable, so that multiplicity
can be removed, regardless the degree of monetization. However, if the CIA holds for
both consumption and investment, the low BGP becomes saddle-point stable, and the
high BGP is undetermined for “low” levels of pmonetization, but saddle-point stable
for “high” levels of monetization. In this case, the model conducts to multiplicity and
indetermination of BGPs. Consequently, in terms of economic policy, our model calls for
a strong monetization of public debt and deficits, both to increase economic growth and
welfare along the BGP, and to avoid short-run indeterminacy of economic growth paths.
Our model can be seen as unifying two strands of literature. On the one hand,
in the current context of large and increasingly debt ratios, a considerable amount of
theoretical and empirical work focused on analyzing growth and welfare effects of debt
and deficits. In endogenous growth settings, but without productive services of public
expenditure, Saint-Paul (1992) and Futagami & Shibata (1998) find that higher debt and
deficits are harmful to economic growth. On the theoretical side, these findings have been
extended by Minea & Villieu (2010, 2012), who show that, even if deficits are devoted to
productive expenditure, long-run economic growth is worsened by the presence of public
debt, because the crowding-out effect of the debt burden always outmatches the increase
in public spending authorized by the deficits along the BGP. Nevertheless, as shows
our present results, monetization of public debt or fiscal deficits significantly modifies
this result. On the empirical side, previous work established a negative relationship
between public debt and economic growth.8 However, subsequent studies, especially
since Reinhart & Rogoff’s (2010) controversial findings, suggested that the effect of debt
on growth might be subject to threshold effects.9 Our setup suggests revisiting the debt-
growth relationship, which could be crucially altered by fiscal and monetary policies
interactions through debt and deficits monetization.
On the other hand, an important strand of literature explores the effects of the form
of the money demand on economic growth, based on the classical contributions of Tobin
(1965), Clower (1967), Sidrauski (1967), Stockman (1981), and Abel (1985). Capital-
izing on the setup of Wang & Yip (1992), Palivos et al. (1993), and Palivos & Yip
(1995), who develop CIA endogenous growth models, a large literature emphasized sev-
eral mechanisms through which the CIA constraint may give rise to multiplicity and/or
indeterminacy of BGPs.10 For example, in an “Ak” model with a CIA money demand,
8See, e.g. Patillo et al. (2002) and Clements et al. (2003) for developing countries, and Kumar &
Woo (2010) and Chudik et al. (2013) for samples mixing advanced and developing countries.
9Such threshold effects are defended by Minea & Parent (2012), Baum et al. (2013), Pescatori et al.
(2014), and Egert (2015) in developed countries, and by Eberhardt & Presbitero (2013) and Kourtellos
et al. (2013) in developing countries.
10The possibility of indeterminacy in dynamic equilibrium models has been largely explored in the
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Suen & Yip (2005) show that indeterminacy is caused by a strong intertemporal substi-
tution effect on capital accumulation. Next, Itaya & Mino (2007) emphasize the crucial
role of technology and preferences for multiplicity. Moreover, when the CIA only par-
tially affects consumption, Bosi & Magris (2003), in a one-sector, and Bosi et al. (2010),
in a two-sector economy, show that indeterminacy and multiplicity can occur. Finally,
Bosi & Dufourt (2008) and Chen & Guo (2008) highlight that the form of the CIA, and
specifically the extent to which it affects investment, is the key factor in generating inde-
terminacy. By studying debt and deficits monetization, our model extends these works
in several dimensions. First, we introduce a role for government spending, through pro-
ductive services of public expenditures. Second, we relax an important assumption of
this literature, namely the presence of a balanced budget rule.11 Third, by accounting
for the possibility of debt monetization, we go beyond the recent analysis of Futagami
et al. (2008) and Minea & Villieu (2012), who discuss the issue of multiplicity and
indeterminacy of the BGP in models with public investment and debt.
Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 describes the long-run solution and presents
some preliminary results on the effect of deficit and monetization. Section 4 studies the
model with a CIA constraint on consumption only. Section 5 discusses the way indeter-
minacy can occur in the model with a CIA constraint on consumption and investment.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
We consider a continuous-time endogenous growth model describing a closed economy
populated with a private sector and a Government.
2.1. The private sector
The private sector consists of a producer-consumer infinitely-lived representative
agent, who maximizes the present value of a discounted sum of instantaneous utility func-
tions based on consumption ct > 0, with ρ > 0 the discount rate and S ≡ −uccct/uc > 0
(with uc ≡ du (ct) /dct) the consumption elasticity of substitution
U =
∞∫
0
u (ct) exp (−ρt)dt, u (ct) =
{
S
S−1
{
(ct)
S−1
S − 1
}
, for S 6= 1
log (ct) , for S = 1
. (1)
For U to be bounded, we need to ensure that (S − 1) γc < Sρ, where γx is the long-run
growth rate of variable x.12
literature (for a survey of the mechanisms that can give rise to indeterminacy, see, e.g. Benhabib &
Farmer, 1999).
11In a setup with no debt nor seigniorage, Palivos et al. (2003) and Park & Philippopoulos (2004)
show that endogenous public investment can lead to both multiplicity and indeterminacy of BGPs.
12This condition corresponds to a no-Ponzi game constraint γc < r, with r the real interest rate to be
defined below.
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Output is produced with private capital and productive public expenditure gt
yt = Akαt g
1−α
t . (2)
All variables are per capita and population is normalized to unity. 0 < α < 1 is the
elasticity of output to private capital. Public expenditure provides “productive services”,
and as such enters the production function, with an elasticity 1 − α (as in Barro, 1990).
Household’s budget constraint is (we define x˙t ≡ dxt/dt, ∀xt)
k˙t + b˙t + m˙t = rtbt + (1− τ) yt − ct − δkt − πtmt. (3)
The Household uses her net income ((1 − τ) yt, with τ a flat tax rate on output) to
consume (ct) and to invest (k˙t + δkt, with δ the rate of private capital depreciation). In
addition, the Household can buy government bonds (bt), which return the real interest
rate rt, and hold money. All variables are defined in real terms (i.e. deflated by the price
level) and πtmt represents the “inflation tax” on real money holdings.
To motivate a demand for real balances, we also suppose that the Household is subject
to the following cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint13
φcct + φk
(
k˙t + δkt
)
= mt, (4)
where φc > 0 and φk ≥ 0 are parameters reflecting the transaction technology. If φk = 0
the CIA constraints holds for consumption only, while it also affects investment if φk > 0
(see Stockman, 1981).
2.2. Monetary and fiscal authorities
The Government provides productive public expenditure, levies taxes on output, and
borrows from the Household. He also collects the inflation tax on real balances;14 hence
the following budget constraint in real terms
b˙t +
M˙t
Pt
= b˙t + m˙t + πtmt = rtbt + gt − τyt ≡ dt. (5)
The budget constraint (5) is an extension of those in Barro (1990) and in Minea
& Villieu (2012). Barro (1990) considers only balanced-budget-rules (gt = τyt), while
Minea & Villieu (2012) introduce public debt, but without money
(
b˙t = rtbt + gt − τyt
)
.
In our model, by using public debt and seigniorage, the Government can make productive
expenditure eventually higher than fiscal revenues τyt. Thus, we define the deficit as dt.
This deficit can be financed either by issuing debt
(
b˙t
)
or by issuing money
(
M˙t/Pt
)
,
with Mt and Pt the money stock and the price level, respectively.
To close the model, we have to specify the instruments available for public finance.
First, it must be emphasized that, to obtain an endogenous growth solution, productive
13We assume that the nominal interest rate is strictly positive, so the CIA constraint holds as a strict
equality.
14In our model, high-powered money is the only form of money, so that the Central Bank collects
the inflation tax and transfers it to the Government. We ignore possible developments related to the
presence of banking and financial sectors.
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public expenditure must be endogenous in the Government budget constraint. In what
follows, we suppose that the Government adopts a deficit rule, which specifies a gradual
adjustment path of the deficit-to-output ratio to a long-run target. Let dyt ≡ dt/yt be the
deficit-to-GDP ratio and θ ≡ d∗/y∗ its long-run target, where a star denotes steady-state
values. At each period, the deficit ratio evolves according to
d˙yt = −μ (dyt − θ) . (6)
Thus, the fiscal policy instruments are the flat tax rate (τ), the target for the deficit-
to-GDP ratio in the long-run (θ), and the speed of adjustment of current deficit to this
target (μ). A low value of the latter parameter describes a “gradualist” strategy (i.e.
the speed of adjustment of the deficit ratio is small), and a high value accounts for a
“shock therapy” strategy, which gives rise to a faster reduction in the deficit ratio. In
addition, monetary authorities must decide the deficit share they accept to monetize.
For simplicity, we assume that a fraction η ∈ [0, 1] of the deficit is monetized at each
instant, namely
m˙t + πtmt = ηdt. (7)
It follows that the Government must cover the remaining part of deficit by issuing
public debt
b˙t = (1− η)dt. (8)
2.3. Equilibrium
By solving Household’s program (see Appendix A) we obtain the two following rela-
tions
c˙t
ct
= S
[
rt − ρ− φ
cR˙t
1 + φcRt
]
, (9)
(1− τ) αA (gt/kt)1−α
1 + φkRt
− δ = rt − φ
kR˙t
1 + φkRt
. (10)
Relation (9) is the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule obtained in standard optimal growth
problems. With a CIA constraint on consumption goods (φc > 0), the consumption
path is affected by the path of the nominal interest rate, which represents a part of
the effective cost of consumption. Thus, in periods with increasing (decreasing) nominal
interest rates, the growth rate of consumption will be lower (higher) than under the usual
Keynes-Ramsey rule. Relation (10) defines the real return of capital. In the absence of
the CIA constraint on capital goods, this return is simply the real interest rate (the rate
of return of Government bonds). With a CIA requirement on investment
(
φk > 0
)
, the
return of capital is lower, since it must be deflated by the financing cost
(
1 + φkRt
)
,
as shown by first term in the LHS of (10). In addition, the nominal interest rate path
introduces a wedge between the return of bonds and the return of capital: with a growing
nominal interest rate, the return of capital will be lower, as shown by the second term
of the RHS of (10).
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Since we are interested in an endogenous growth solution, we transform variables into
long-run stationary ratios. To do this, we deflate all steady-state growing variables by
the capital stock, namely xk ≡ xt/kt (and we henceforth remove time indexes). Thus,
the CIA constraint (4) becomes
mk = φcck + φk
(
k˙
k
+ δ
)
, (11)
where the path of the capital stock is obtained from the goods market equilibrium
k˙
k
= yk − ck − gk − δ, (12)
with the production function defined as
yk = Ag1−αk . (13)
We extract the deficit-to-capital ratio from the Government budget constraint (5)
dk = rbk + gk − τyk, (14)
and the behavior of monetary and fiscal authorities (7)-(8) leads to
m˙
m
= η
(
dk
mk
)
− π, (15)
b˙
b
= (1− η)
(
dk
bk
)
. (16)
Assuming Fisher’s equation R ≡ r + π, relations (9)-(16), together with the deficit
rule (6), fully characterize the equilibrium of the model.
3. The long-run endogenous growth solution
In our endogenous growth setting, we define a BGP as a path in which consumption,
capital, public spending, money, output, public debt, and deficit grow at a common (en-
dogenous) rate
(
γ∗ = c˙/c = k˙/k = m˙/m = b˙/b = d˙/d
)
, while the real (r∗) and nominal
(R∗) interest rates (and, as a consequence, the inflation rate π∗) are constant. Thus, in
the steady-state, the real interest rate is defined by
r∗ =
(1− τ) αAg∗k1−α
1 + φkR∗
− δ, (17)
and the rate of economic growth is simply
γ∗ = S (r∗ − ρ) . (18)
In addition, since d∗k = θy
∗
k, we obtain from (16)
(1− η) θAg∗k1−α = γ∗b∗k, (19)
and, from the definition of deficit in Government’s budget constraint (5)
r∗b∗k = (θ + τ) Ag
∗
k
1−α − g∗k. (20)
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3.1. The effect of deficit and monetization in the long-run: some intuition
Proposition 1. (Deficits and monetization in the long-run) For a given long-run eco-
nomic growth (γ∗):
(i) any increase in the degree of deficit monetization increases the public expenditure
to capital ratio in the long-run;
(ii) any increase in the deficit target reduces the public expenditure to capital ratio in
the long-run if monetization is small (namely η < ηˉ), but rises it if monetization
is large (η > ηˉ), where: ηˉ ≡ (r∗ − γ∗)/r∗ = 1− γ∗ρ+γ∗/S ∈ ]0, 1].
Proof.
From (18), (19) and (20), we obtain the public-spending-to-capital ratio in steady-state:
g∗k =
[
(θ + τ) A− (1− η) θA
(
r∗
γ∗
)]1/α
. (21)
Thus, by (21), it is clear that:
(i) ∂g
∗
k
∂η
∣∣∣
γ∗
> 0 and,
(ii) ∂g
∗
k
∂θ
∣∣∣
γ∗
≥ 0 ⇔ 1 ≥ (1− η)
(
r∗
γ∗
)
⇔ η ≥ ηˉ, where η ≡ (r∗ − γ∗)/r∗.
¤
From (21) without deficit (θ = 0), we find the solution of Barro (1990), namely:
g∗k = (τA)
1/α ≡ gBk . With deficit but no monetization (θ > 0 and η = 0), the public
spending ratio is lower
(
g∗k < g
B
k
)
, namely g∗k = [τA− θA (r∗ − γ∗) /γ∗]1/α. Since the
standard transversality condition ensures that r∗ > γ∗, for the consumption path to
be bounded, the public spending ratio is lower with deficits (and no monetization) than
under a balanced budget rule. The basic mechanism driving this crowding-out effect is the
following. On the one hand, deficits generate a permanent flow of new resources
(
b˙
)
. On
the other hand, debt generates a permanent flow of new unproductive expenditures (the
debt burden rb). In steady-state, the standard transversality condition
(
r∗ > γ∗ = b˙/b
)
means that the latter dominates the former
(
rb > b˙
)
, so that any rule that authorizes
permanent deficits involves net costs for public finance in the long-run, irrespective of
the precise nature of this rule.
But this configuration radically changes if deficit-monetization is authorized. Effec-
tively, in such circumstances, the debt burden can be accommodated by money creation.
Suppose, for example, that the deficit is fully monetized (η = 1 in equation (21)); com-
pared to the balanced-budget-rule used in Barro (1990), taxes are now supplemented by
the deficit: g∗k = [(θ + τ) A]
1/α
> gBk if θ > 0. Intuitively, this is because new resources
provided by the deficit are devoted to productive spending, while the (additional) interest
burden is financed by issuing new money.
More generally, Proposition 1 shows that (i) the monetization of fiscal deficits al-
lows reducing their crowding-out effect on productive expenditure, and (ii) can even,
if large enough, increase the latter. As economic growth positively depends on public
9
expenditure, deficits will impede economic growth in the long-run for small values of
monetization, but they will increase it for high values of monetization. However, this
result is only preliminary; indeed, in equilibrium ηˉ depends on η (and on other parame-
ters of the model), since γ∗ is an endogenous function of parameters, including η. In the
following, we present the long-run solution of the model.
3.2. The steady-state
From (17) and (18) we compute the long-run solution of the model
γ∗ = S
[
(1− τ) αAg∗k1−α
1 + φkR∗
− δ − ρ
]
. (22)
Using (15) with π∗ = R∗ − r∗, we obtain in steady-state
ηθAg∗k
1−α − (γ∗ − r∗ + R∗) m∗k = 0, (23)
which combined with (18) yields: R∗ = ρ+ηθAg∗k
1−α/m∗k+γ
∗ (1− S)/S. By introducing
this relation into (22), we get a first implicit relation between γ∗ and g∗k
g∗k =

[
1 + φk
(
ηθAg∗k
1−α
m∗k (γ∗, g
∗
k)
+ ρ +
γ∗ (1− S)
S
)] (γ∗
S + ρ + δ
)
αA (1− τ)

1
1−α
≡ F (γ∗) , (24)
where the money-to-capital ratio comes from (11) in steady-state
m∗k (γ
∗, g∗k) =
(
φc − φk) [Ag∗k1−α − g∗k − γ∗ − δ]+ φk (Ag∗k1−α − g∗k) .
In addition, (18) and (21) provide a second implicit relation between γ∗ and g∗k
g∗k =
[
(θ + τ) A− (1− η) θA
(
1
S
+
ρ
γ∗
)]1/α
≡ G (γ∗) . (25)
Relations (24) and (25) allow computing γ∗ and g∗k, and the remaining endogenous vari-
ables in the steady-state: y∗k = Ag
∗
k
1−α, b∗k = (1− η) θy∗k/γ∗, c∗k = y∗k − γ∗ − g∗k − δ,
r∗ = ρ+γ∗/S, m∗k =
(
φc − φk) c∗k +φk (y∗k − g∗k), R∗ = ρ+ ηθy∗k/m∗k +γ∗ (1− S)/S, and
π∗ = R∗ − r∗.
Before studying the effect of deficit and monetization, it can be useful to describes the
long-run solution of the model without deficit (and consequently without monetization).
Definition 1. (The steady-state solutions without public deficit ) Without public deficit
(θ = 0) the model gives rise to two solutions: a no-growth solution (that we call the
“Solow” solution γS = 0) and a positive growth solution (that we call the “Barro” solution
γB > 0).
We find the “Solow” solution by putting θ = γ∗ = 0 in (24), namely: gSk =[(
1 + ρφk
)
(ρ + δ)/αA (1− τ)] 11−α and γS = 0 (point S in Figure 1 below), and the
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“Barro” solution by putting θ = 0 in (25), namely: gBk = (τA)
1/α, and, from (24), γB
comes from the following implicit relation15(
1 + φk
[
ρ +
γB (1− S)
S
])(
γB
S
+ ρ + δ
)
= αA (1− τ) (τA) 1−αα . (26)
This solution corresponds to a zero stock of public debt in the steady state
(
bBk = 0
)
and is depicted by point B in Figure 1 below.
Intuitively, the no-growth solution comes from the fact that public debt is very
high in the long-run.16 Effectively, with θ = 0, public debt must be constant but
not necessarily zero in the long-run. From (20) with γB = 0 ⇒ r∗ = ρ, we get:
bSk =
(
gSk
)1−α [
τA− (gSk )α] /ρ > 0. The Solow solution results from the fact that the
constant level of public debt forces private capital to be constant in the long-run to
achieve a constant steady-state bSk ratio. Thus, economic growth disappears in steady-
state
(
γS = 0
)
.
In what follows we reintroduce deficit and monetization, and we study two configu-
rations of the model, with a CIA constraint on consumption only
(
φk = 0
)
and with a
CIA constraint both on consumption and investment
(
φk > 0
)
.
4. The model with a CIA constraint on consumption only
We first establish the multiplicity of BGPs in the long-run, before studying their local
dynamics.
4.1. Deficits and monetization in the long-run
Proposition 2. (Multiplicity of BGPs) For θ > 0 and 0 ≤ η < 1, two BGPs characterize
the long-run solution of the model: a high BGP
(
γ∗h
)
and a low BGP
(
0 < γ∗l < γ∗h
)
.
Proof.
On the one hand, with a CIA constraint on consumption only
(
φk = 0
)
, relation (24) is
much simpler and becomes independent of the deficit ratio (θ), since
g∗k =

(
γ∗
S + ρ + δ
)
αA (1− τ)

1
1−α
≡ F (γ∗) . (24a)
Therefore, it is clear that F ∈ C∞(R∗), and that F is an increasing strictly convex
function, since F ′(γ∗) = 1/{(1 − α)F(γ∗)} > 0, and F ′′(γ∗) = α/{(1 − α)F(γ∗)}2 > 0.
In addition, F (0) =
[
ρ+δ
αA(1−τ)
] 1
1−α ≡ gSk > 0, and limγ∗→+∞F (γ
∗) = +∞.
15We assume a unique solution (this is straightforward if S = 1).
16Notice that, even with a balanced-budget rule (rtbt + gt − τyt = 0 in the long-run), public debt is
not necessarily zero in steady-state.
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On the other hand, by inverting the relation (25), the second implicit relation (G(∙))
between γ∗ and g∗k becomes
γ∗ =
ρ(1− η)θA
S[(θ + τ)A− g∗kα]− (1− η)θA
≡ G˜(g∗k). (25a)
By (25a), we notice that G˜ ∈ C2(]−∞, g∗k[), where g∗k ≡ [(θ + τ)A− (1− η)θA/S]1/α >
gSk = F(0) ≥ 0,17 hence, g∗k < (>) gBk if η < (>) 1 − S. Besides, G˜ is a monotonically
increasing function on ] −∞, g∗k[, since G˜′(g∗k) = ρ(1−η)θAαSg1−αk {S[(θ+τ)A−g∗αk ]−(1−η)θA}2 > 0. At
last, lim
g∗k→−∞
G˜ (γ∗) = 0, and lim
g∗k→g
∗
k
G˜ (γ∗) = +∞.
Finally, as g∗k > g
S
k , according to Bolzano’s theorem, there are two values of γ
∗,
denoted by γ∗1 and γ
∗
2 , such as: γ
∗
i > 0, and (G˜ ◦ F)(γ∗i ) = γ∗i , i = 1, 2. As BGPs are
obtained at the intersection of (24a) and (25a), we define by γ∗h ≡ max(γ∗1 , γ∗2 ) the high
BGP solution, and by γ∗l ≡ min(γ∗1 , γ∗2 ) the low BGP solution (see Figure 1).
¤
Figure 1: Multiplicity of the BGPs
The intuitive explanation of this multiplicity is the following. Economic growth pos-
itively depends on the public-expenditure-to-capital ratio, which increases the marginal
productivity of private capital in the Keynes-Ramsey rule (24a). In addition, public
expenditure is an increasing function of economic growth in the Government budget
constraint (25), because growth allows reducing public debt in the long-run (in the
steady-state b∗k = (1− η) θy∗k/γ∗). Consequently, the higher economic growth, the lower
the public debt, with an unchanged deficit target (θ). This dual interaction between
economic growth and public expenditure generates multiplicity: for the same set of pa-
rameters, a high BGP (H) and a low BGP (L) coexist. Effectively, a high growth, by
17The case g
∗
k≤ˉgSk is not relevant because there is no equilibrium in this situation
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reducing the debt burden, allows increasing public expenditure, which further enhances
growth, while low growth magnifies the crowding-out effect of debt on productive public
spending, which, in turn, decreases growth.
Proposition 3. (The effect of deficits and monetization on BGPs) Any upwards shift
in the deficit target (θ):
(i) increases the low BGP
(
γ∗l
)
,
(ii) reduces the high BGP
(
γ∗h
)
if monetization is small (η < ηˉ), but increases the high
BGP if monetization is large (η > ηˉ).
Proof.
A shift in the deficit target (θ) leaves the F (γ∗) curve unchanged, but, in accordance
with Proposition 1, moves the G (γ∗) curve. From (25) we obtain
dg∗k
dθ
∣∣∣∣
γ∗
=
A
α
[
1− (1− η)
(
1
S
+
ρ
γ∗
)]
g∗k
1−α ≡
[
η − ηˉ
1− ηˉ
]
A
α
g∗k
1−α, (27)
where η ≡ (r∗ − γ∗)/r∗.
Clearly, the G (γ∗) curve pivots around point: (γˉ∗, gˉ∗k) , with γˉ∗ ≡ S(1−η)ρS−1+η and gˉ∗k =
gBk , which corresponds to η = ηˉ, and we have: Sgn{ dg
∗
k
dθ
∣∣∣
γ∗
} = Sgn {(S − 1 + η) (γ∗ − γˉ∗)} .
First, if η ≤ 1 − S, since γˉ∗ < 0 , dg∗kdθ
∣∣∣
γ∗
< 0 for any positive value of γ∗. In this case,
the G (γ∗) curve moves towards the left for any positive value of γ∗; hence the low BGP
increases and the high BGP decreases, since G is an increasing convex function. Second,
if η > 1 − S, Sgn{ dg∗kdθ
∣∣∣
γ∗
} = Sgn {γ∗ − γˉ∗} = Sgn {η − ηˉ}. Yet, F (γ∗) = gBk precisely
when η = ηˉ. Therefore, if monetization is low (η < ηˉ), the pivot point is above the F (γ∗)
curve, as in Figure 2a; whereas if monetization is high (η > ηˉ), on the contrary, the pivot
point is below the F (γ∗) curve, as in Figure 2b. In both cases, an increase in the deficit
target raises the low BGP (from L1 to L2 in Figure 2) but it reduces the high BGP in
the former case (from H1 to H2 in Figure 2a) and increases it (from H1 to H
′
2 in Figure
2b) in the latter. ¤
(a): η < ηˉ (b): η > ηˉ
Figure 2: Effect of an increase in the deficit target
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However, as we will show below, the low BGP is unstable; thus, we can exclude
multiplicity on the basis of dynamic analysis. Consequently, if we consider only the
stable high BGP, the optimal degree of deficit-monetization, from the point of view of
economic growth, is one (i.e. full monetization).
For small values of the deficit target, we can extract the precise value of monetization
that allows a deficit-increase to be growth-enhancing along the high BGP. Effectively,
since by construction γB is independent from η in Definition 1, we have, for θ → 0 :
dγ∗h
dθ > (<) 0 if η > (<) ηˉ = 1− γ
B
ρ+γB/S
.
In addition, simulation-based results show that the same holds from a long-run welfare
perspective. On the BGP, Household’s welfare (1) becomes18
U =

(ρ [Log (c∗) + Log (K0)] + γ∗)/ρ2 if S = 1,
S
{
(c∗K0)
S−1
S
ρ−γ∗(S−1)/S − 1ρ
}
/(S − 1) if S 6= 1,
(28)
where K0 is the initial capital stock (that we normalize to be one in our simulations).
Since a change in the degree of monetization impacts economic growth and consump-
tion in steady-state, namely c∗k = y
∗
k − γ∗− g∗k − δ, its effect on welfare might differ from
its effect on growth. However, simulations show that a higher degree of monetization
enhances Household’s welfare on the high BGP (see Figure 3).19
Figure 3: Monetization, Economic Growth and Welfare in the long-run (high BGP)
18We focus on steady-state welfare effects, namely we compare different BGPs associated with different
values of parameters. In other words, we are not interested in the transition from a steady-state to
another, and we do not study transitional dynamics following a change of parameters; thus, we perform
comparative statics among different BGPs.
19We use standard values of parameters in our benchmark calibration: φc = S = A = 1, ρ = 0.1
and δ = 0. In particular, the tax rate equals its optimal value in the Barro (1990) model, and the
productivity of public capital is the one estimated by Aschauer (1989), namely τ = 1− α = 0.4.
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As shows Figure 3, an increase in the deficit target (say, a target of 3% of GDP,
relative to the balanced-budget rule θ = 0) generates welfare losses when monetization is
low, but welfare gains if the degree of monetization is high. Thus, the effect of deficit on
long-run welfare corroborates our findings for the impact of deficits on economic growth.
4.2. Transitional dynamics
To study transitional dynamics, we compute a reduced form of the model. From (9)
with φk = 0, the real interest rate equals the net marginal return of capital
r = (1− τ) αAg1−αk − δ ≡ r (gk) . (29)
Then, from the definition of the deficit in Government’s budget constraint (5), it
comes, with dk = dyyk = dyAg1−αk
bk =
(dy + τ) Ag1−αk − gk
r (gk)
≡ b (dy, gk) . (30)
Finally, by defining
γk = Ag1−αk − ck − gk − δ ≡ γ (ck, gk) , (31)
the reduced form is the following (see Appendix B)
d˙y = −μ (dy − θ)
g˙k
gk
=
r(gk)[(1−η)dyAg1−αk −γ(ck,gk)b(dy,gk)]+μAg1−αk (dy−θ)
[τ−α(1−τ)b(dy,gk)](r(gk)+δ)−gk+(1−α)dyAg1−αk
R˙ =
(
1+φcR
φc
) [
r (gk)− ρ− 1S
(
ηdyAg
1−α
k
φcck
+ r (gk)−R
)]
c˙k =
ηdyAg
1−α
k
φc − [γ (ck, gk)− r (gk) + R] ck
. (32)
In this reduced form, there are two jump variables (R and ck) and two predetermined
variables (dy and gk). Effectively, the deficit-to-output ratio (dy) cannot jump at any
time, because it is defined by the smooth adjustment dynamics (6). Moreover, the debt-
to-output ratio bk = b/k cannot jump, because the stocks of public debt (b) and of capital
(k) are predetermined at each instant. Thus, from (30), it comes that gk is not a free
jump variable.
Proposition 4. (Transitional dynamics) For small values of the deficit target (θ), the
high BGP is saddle-path stable, while the low BGP is unstable.
Proof.
See Appendix D. To study local dynamics of steady-states, we linearize system (32) in
the neighborhood of BGPs, namely, using the index h (l) to design the high (low) BGP
d˙y
g˙k
R˙
c˙k
 = Ji1

dy − d∗iy
gk − g∗ik
R−R∗i
ck − c∗ik
 , i ∈ {h, l},
15
where Ji1 is the Jacobian matrix in the neighborhood of BGP i = h, l. For Blanchard-
Kahn conditions to be fulfilled, Ji1 must contain 2 negative eigenvalues and 2 positive
eigenvalues. In addition, the autonomous dynamics of the deficit-to-output ratio (equa-
tion (6)) shows that one eigenvalue equals −μ < 0. Appendix D shows that, as
θ → 0, Jh1 contains two positive and two negative eigenvalues, equal respectively to:
λ1 =
(
1 + φcR∗h
)
/Sφc > 0 and λ2 = c∗hk > 0, λ3 = −μ < 0, λ4 = −γB < 0, while Jl1
has one negative and three positive eigenvalues.
By continuity on the right of S point and on the left of B point, the low BGP is
unstable and the high BGP is saddle-point stable, as confirmed by simulations of the
reduced form in Figures 4a-b. ¤
Figure 4a: Simulations of eigenvalues (high BGP): eigenvalue four is equal to -0.05
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Figure 4b: Simulations of eigenvalues (low BGP): eigenvalue four is equal to -0.05
Consequently, we can exclude multiplicity on the basis of the analysis of local dynam-
ics: only the high BGP is relevant in equilibrium.
5. The model with a CIA constraint on consumption and investment
As in the preceding Section, we first describe the long-run solution of the model,
before studying local dynamics.
5.1. Deficits and monetization in the long-run
With a CIA constraint on consumption and investment
(
φk > 0
)
, multiplicity still
characterizes the long-run steady-state solution. The following Proposition establishes
the properties of these solutions relative to public deficits and monetization.
Proposition 5. (The effect of deficits and monetization on BGPs) For “small” deficit
targets (θ), any upwards shift in θ
(i) increases the low BGP
(
γ∗l
)
and,
(ii) reduces the high BGP
(
γ∗h
)
if monetization is “small”
(
η < η
)
but increases the
high BGP if monetization is “large”
(
η > η
)
, with η > ηˉ defined below.
Proof.
With a CIA on consumption and investment, relation (25) is unchanged, but (24) becomes
g∗k =

[
1 + φk
[
ηθA
φk (A− g∗kα)
+ ρ +
γ∗ (1− S)
S
]] (γ∗
S + ρ + δ
)
αA (1− τ)

1
1−α
, (24b)
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and, by substituting g∗k
α from (25), we find
g∗k =

[
1 +
ηθA
(A− (G (γ∗))α) + φ
kρ +
φkγ∗ (1− S)
S
] (γ∗
S + ρ + δ
)
αA (1− τ)

1
1−α
≡ F (γ∗) .
(34)
In this configuration, both F (γ∗) and G (γ∗) curves depend on the deficit ratio (θ):
following an increase in θ, G (γ∗) moves as in the previous Section, while F (γ∗) moves
downwards; effectively, from (24b): dg
∗
k
dθ
∣∣∣
γ∗
= ητ
α(1−τ)2
(
γ∗
S + ρ + δ
)
> 0 for “small”
deficit values (θ → 0).
Since the low BGP is located on the left of the pivot point of G (γ∗), both moves are
favorable for economic growth along this BGP. To establish the effect of deficits along
the high BGP, first notice that, in equilibrium: F (γ∗h) = G (γ∗h); thus, γ∗h is defined
by the implicit relation K(γ∗h, θ) = 0, where
K (γ∗h, θ) ≡ [1 + ηθA(
A− (G (γ∗h, θ))α) + φkρ + φkγ∗h (1− S)S
]
h
(
γ∗h
)−(G (γ∗h, θ))1−α ,
(35)
with h(γ∗h) ≡ (ρ + δ + γ∗h/S)/αA(1− τ).
Therefore, for usual values of parameters (in particular, as soon as S ≤ 1) we can
establish
∂K (γ∗h, θ)
∂γ∗h
=
[
1 + φkρ +
φkγ∗h (1− S)
S
]
h′
(
γ∗h
)
+
φk (1− S)
S
h
(
γ∗h
)
> 0,
and,
−∂K
(
γ∗h, θ
)
∂θ
=
(1− α)Gθ
(G (γ∗h, θ))α − h
(
γ∗h
) ηA(
A− (G (γ∗h, θ))α) . (36)
Consequently, as K ∈ C1(R2) and since G(γ∗h, θ) < A1/α, using the implicit function
theorem we obtain, for “small” values of deficit (θ → 0)20
dγ∗h
dθ
= − ∂K
(
γ∗h, θ
)
/∂θ
∂K (γ∗h, θ) /∂γ∗h . (37)
Thus, when θ → 0, (36) becomes
−∂K
(
γ∗h, θ
)
∂θ
=
(1− α)Gθ
Aτ
− h (γ∗h) η
(1− τ) . (38)
We can remark in particular that, for η = ηˉ, Gθ = 0, thus: −∂K
(
γ∗h, θ
)
/∂θ < 0
and, by (37), dγ∗h/dθ < 0. We find the value of η by setting ∂K (γ∗h, θ) /∂θ = 0 in
(38), namely, using (27):
(
1−α
α
)
(τA)
1−α
α
(η−ηˉ)
(1−ηˉ) = h
(
γ∗h
)
ητ
(1−τ) > 0. Thus: η > ηˉ, which
20Remark that Gγ∗ → 0 as θ → 0.
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proves Proposition 5. It follows that dγ∗h/dθ > 0 if η > η, where η is defined by the
following implicit relation21
η ≡
(
1− α
α
)(
1− τ
τ
)(
1− (1− η)( 1
S
+
ρ
γB
))[
1 + φk
[
ρ +
γB (1− S)
S
]]
. (39)
¤
Figure 5: The BGPs (blue line: θ = 1%, red line θ = 5%)
Figure 5 presents a graphical confirmation of result (ii) in Proposition 5. Based
on benchmark values of parameters, an increase in the deficit decreases the high BGP
if monetization is “small” (η = 10%, in Figure 5a), but increases the high BGP if
monetization is “large” (η = 60%, in Figure 5b).
The fact that the effect of monetization on the high BGP is weakened when the CIA
constraint affects investment comes from the inflation tax on capital accumulation: by
monetizing the deficit, monetary authorities can avoid the devastating effect of the debt
burden on public spending, but at the cost of a reduction in private investment, because
of higher funding costs (due to the increase in the inflationary tax associated with higher
monetization).
Figures 6a-b show that, for our baseline calibration, economic growth and Household’s
welfare increase with the degree of monetization on the high BGP, but decrease on the
low BGP.22 Therefore, along the low BGP, increasing deficit-monetization is undesirable,
especially since the debt-to-GDP ratio rises as deficit monetization grows. Effectively,
economic growth becomes so weak, that the reduction in public debt accumulation due
to monetizing deficits does not suffice to generate a decrease in the debt ratio.
21Remark that, in the neighborhood of the high BGP: γ∗h → γB as θ → 0. From Definition 1, γB is
independent from η.
22In our baseline calibration we set φk = 0.5.
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Figure 6a: Monetization, Economic Growth and Welfare in the long-run (high BGP)
Figure 6b: Monetization, Economic Growth and Welfare in the long-run (low BGP)
5.2. Transitional dynamics
The model with a CIA on consumption and investment gives rise to a five-variable
reduced form, which can be solved recursively (see Appendix B)
d˙y = −μ (dy − θ)
b˙k = (1− η) dyAg1−αk − γ (ck, gk) bk
R˙ =
[
(r (dy, gk, bk) + δ)
(
1 + φkR
)− (1− τ) αAg1−αk ] /φk
c˙k = S
[
r (dy, gk, bk)− ρ− φcR˙/(1 + φcR)
]
ck − γ (ck, gk) ck
g˙k =
{
ηdyAg
1−α
k − [γ (ck, gk)− r (dy, gk, bk) + R] m (ck, gk)−
(
φc − φk) c˙k} /φkz (gk)
,
(40)
20
where γ (ck, gk) is defined by (31), z (gk) ≡ (1− α) Ag−αk − 1 and
mk =
(
φc − φk) ck + φk (Ag1−αk − gk) ≡ m (ck, gk) , (41)
r =
(
(dy + τ) Ag1−αk − gk
)
/bk ≡ r (dy, gk, bk) . (42)
As in the previous case, there are 2 predetermined variables in this system. Effectively
the public debt ratio bk and the deficit to output ratio dy cannot jump.
The linearization of (40) in the neighborhood of BGPs provides the following system
d˙y
b˙k
R˙
c˙k
g˙k
 = Ji2

dy − d∗iy
bk − b∗ik
R−R∗i
ck − c∗ik
gk − g∗ik
 , i = h, l, (43)
where Ji2 stands for the Jacobian matrix in the neighborhood of BGP i = h, l. For
Blanchard-Kahn conditions to be fulfilled, Ji2 must contain 2 negative eigenvalues (with
one eigenvalue equal to −μ) and 3 positive eigenvalues.
Proposition 6. (Multiplicity and indeterminacy ) Based on our simulation results
(i) the low BGP is saddle-path stable and,
(ii) the high BGP is locally undetermined or saddle-path depending on parameters.
Proof. Simulation-based Proof.
The inspection of the reduced form (40) reveals that the dynamics are much more complex
than in the model with a CIA only on consumption. In particular, we can remark that the
dynamics fundamentally shift with the value of the term z (gk) in system (40). Effectively,
the system is not defined for z (gk) = 0, and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix Ji2
changes sign whenever z
(
g∗ik
)
changes sign. Noticeably, the case z
(
g∗ik
)
= 0, namely
g∗ik = A
1/α (1− α)1/α ≡ gˆ∗k, corresponds to the first-best public-spending-to-capital ratio
in a model without deficit or money. From (25), we obtain, with ηˉ ≡ 1− γ∗ρ+γ∗/S
g∗k =
[
(1− α) A + Aθ
[
1− (1− η)
(
1
S
+
ρ
γ∗
)]]1/α
= A1/α [1− α + ε (γ∗)]1/α , (44)
where ε (γ∗) ≡ τ + α − 1 + θ (η−ηˉ)(1−ηˉ) . Therefore, if ε
(
γ∗i
)
> (<) 0, then g∗ik > (<) gˆ
∗
k
and z
(
g∗ik
)
< (>) 0. Along the low BGP, γ∗l → 0, so that ηˉ → 1 and ε (γ∗l) < 0
independently of parameters. Thus: z
(
g∗lk
)
> 0. Since the public-spending-to-capital
ratio is very small along the low BGP, it always lies below the “first-best” level. Along
the high BGP this is no longer the case. Effectively, we can find ranges of parameters
such that z
(
g∗hk
)
> 0 or z
(
g∗hk
)
< 0 alternately. This means that the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix changes sign depending on parameters. Yet, to be fully determined, the
high BGP must be associated to exactly 2 negative eigenvalues. As the determinant of
the Jacobian matrix is the product of the 5 eigenvalues, such a configuration is possible
21
only if it takes a positive value. Consequently, the change of sign of the determinant is
not consistent with determinacy of the high BGP.
More precisely, Appendix E and simulations of system (40) in Figures 7a-b show
that multiplicity can no longer be removed on the basis of the local dynamics of steady-
states. Effectively, the low BGP is now saddle-path stable (the Jacobian matrix presents
2 negative and 3 positive eigenvalues). Moreover, the high BGP is either saddle-path
stable or locally indeterminate, depending on parameters, and in particular on the degree
of monetization. ¤
Figure 7a: Simulations of eigenvalues (high BGP): eigenvalue five is equal to -0.05
22
Figure 7b: Simulations of eigenvalues (low BGP): eigenvalue five is equal to -0.05
The high BGP is locally determined if z
(
g∗hk
)
< 0, namely if g∗hk > gˆ
∗
k.
23 Proposition
6 shows that this configuration corresponds to the following condition
ε
(
γ∗h
)
= τ + α− 1 + θ (η − ηˉ)
(1− ηˉ) > 0. (45)
Determinacy is all the more likely to occur that (i) the degree of monetization is
high,24 and (ii) that the tax rate is high relative to the first best rate (1 − α) (if its
positive direct impact in (45) dominates the negative indirect one coming from the rate
of economic growth in ηˉ). In our baseline simulation, we choose τ = 1−α, so that deter-
minacy is ensured for high degrees of monetization (η > ηˉ). Figure 8 below synthesizes
these results. Determinacy of the high BGP is ensured above the AA line, namely for
high values of monetization. Isogrowth curves show that, consistent with our previous
findings, long-run economic growth is negatively associated with public deficit, for a given
level of monetization, but positively associated with monetization, for a given deficit tar-
get. Thus, by monetizing deficits, monetary authorities can generate productive public
expenditure that ensure both a sizable and determined BGP.
23Therefore, in terms of first-best analysis, the case of local indeterminacy of the high BGP corresponds
to a case of over-accumulation of public expenditure. This is no longer the case in a “second-best”
analysis, in which Policymakers can only choose their instruments (τ, η, θ, μ) to maximize welfare, without
being able to directly choose the public spending ratio gk. Effectively, in a second-best analysis, a high
degree of monetization improves Household’s welfare along the high BGP, as revealed in the previous
section.
24Notice that the rate of economic growth γ∗h positively depends on η; thus any increase in η reduces
the value of ηˉ.
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Figure 8: Isogrowth curves, Determinacy and Indeterminacy Loci of high BGP
5.3. Discussion
Our general result is that the high BGP is in some sense “more stable” than the low
BGP, except for the case of a CIA constraint on consumption and investment with a high
degree of monetization. The reduced form of our model shows that the dynamic proper-
ties of steady-states change due to the behavior of the public debt ratio in Government’s
budget constraint. Effectively, the dynamics of the public debt ratio are driven by the
difference between the debt burden and economic growth. As usual in the analysis of
Government’s budget constraint, a sufficiently high economic growth rate allows circum-
venting the inherent instable dynamics of public debt, thus stabilizing the public debt
ratio. This is the case in the neighborhood of the high BGP. On the contrary, along the
low BGP, economic growth is very low and cannot stabilize the evolution of the public
debt ratio. As the public debt ratio cannot jump, in the model with a CIA constraint
on consumption the high BGP is locally saddle-point stable, while the low BGP is lo-
cally unstable. In the latter case, there is only one negative eigenvalue (associated to
the deficit rule) for two predetermined variables (the public debt ratio and the public
spending ratio).
When the CIA constraint covers both consumption and investment, the same rea-
soning applies, but now the model has one additional “stable” equation. Effectively, the
CIA constraint (4) gives rise to a new determination of the dynamic of the capital stock,
namely k˙t = 1φk (mt − φcct) − δkt, thus generating one additional stable eigenvalue. It
follows that the low BGP becomes saddle-point stable and the high BGP becomes un-
determined.
However there is one exception to this general result. With a CIA constraint on
consumption only, the dynamic of g˙k in (32) is qualitatively unaffected by parameters
(and in particular by the degree of monetization); instead, this does not hold when the
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CIA affects both consumption and investment. Indeed, in the reduced form (40), the
nature of the dynamics of g˙k fundamentally shifts with respect to z (gk).
The intuitive explanation of this shift is the following. The term z (gk) ≡ d(yk−gk)dgk is
the response of the difference between output and public spending following an increase
in public spending, or, in other words, the net impact of an additional unit of productive
public expenditure on the goods equilibrium. Thus any rise in gk increases (decreases)
private demand if z(gk) > 0 (z(gk) < 0). In money market equilibrium, money supply
is defined by the difference between the monetization of public deficit and the inflation
tax (m˙k = ηdk − (π + γ)mk), while money demand comes from the private demand
(consumption plus investment: c+k˙+δk ≡ yd), which positively (z(gk) > 0) or negatively
(z(gk) < 0) depends on productive public expenditure
Ag1−αk − gk = ydk ⇒ z(gk)g˙k = y˙dk.
Suppose that gk > g∗k, ceteris paribus. As, by (42), the real interest rate strongly de-
creases, the inflation rate (π = R−r) jumps up, and the seignorage collection ((π+γ)mk))
becomes higher than the monetization of deficit (ηdk), which is negligible in steady-state
because θ ∼= 0. Thus, the money supply decreases (ηdk < (π + γ)mk ⇒ m˙k < 0). In
equilibrium, money demand must decline, thus private demand must decrease ( y˙dk < 0),
which implies: g˙k < 0 if z(gk) > 0, or g˙k > 0 if z(gk) < 0.
In the first case, the law of motion of gk is stable, leading to indeterminacy of the
BGP, while in the latter, the law of motion of gk is unstable, leading to determinacy of
the BGP. Precisely, along the high BGP, for a “high” degree of monetization, the public
spending ratio becomes so large that the derivative z (gk) becomes negative. As a result
of this novel source of instability, the high BGP loses its undesirable property of being
stable and undetermined, and becomes saddle-path stable.
6. Conclusion
To study long- and short-run effects of monetization, we built in this paper a model
in which economic growth interacts with productive public expenditure. This interaction
can generate two positive balanced growth paths in the long-run: a high BGP and a low
BGP.
From a long-run perspective, our results support the monetization of deficits. In
particular, our model provides a relatively new motivation for monetizing. Usually,
monetization is defended, for example, on the basis of providing seigniorage revenues, or
because Policymakers can reduce the real interest rate by generating inflation surprises.
In our framework, monetization is useful because it avoids (or limits) the crowding-out
effect of public indebtedness on productive public expenditure in the long-run. The latter
motivation for monetization might be stronger than the former two ones. Indeed, on the
one hand, seigniorage revenues are fairly small for public finance, namely less than 1%
of GDP for moderate inflation rates, and up to 5% in high-inflation countries (see, e.g.
Dornbusch & Fischer, 1993, or, Easterly et al., 1995). On the other hand, inflation
surprises cannot be perpetuated in the long-run in rational expectation equilibria. On
the contrary, in our model, money issuance increases economic growth on the long-
run perfect-foresight BGP, owing to a composition effect in public finance, namely the
substitution of a non-interest-bearing asset (money) to public debt in Government’s
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budget constraint. This change in the composition of Government’s liabilities generates
a less distortive way of finance for productive public expenditure.
Furthermore, transitional dynamics crucially depend on the form of the CIA con-
straint. When only consumption is money-constrained, multiplicity can be removed,
and monetizing deficits enhances economic growth and welfare in the long-run. When
the CIA constraint affects both consumption and investment, the local dynamics of the
BGPs depend on the degree of monetization of the deficit. For small monetization rates,
the low BGP is locally determined (saddle-path), but the high BGP becomes locally
undetermined. However, for sufficiently high monetization rates, both BGPs are charac-
terized by the saddle-path property and are locally determined. Thus, if investment is
money-constrained, multiplicity cannot be rejected.
Our findings match numerous results in the literature, emphasizing the importance
of the transaction technology in generating long-run multiplicity and/or indeterminacy
of perfect-foresight equilibria. However, in our model, the fundamental non-linearity
governing the determination of the equilibrium growth rate comes from Government’s
budget constraint. In this constraint, public debt crowds out productive expenditure
in the long-run, thus generating two BGPs: one with a strong economic growth, which
gives rise to a small debt burden relative to income and a large share of productive public
expenditure, with a positive feedback effect on economic growth. The other is associated
with low growth and weak productive expenditure, due to the magnitude of the debt
burden, which in turn does not support economic growth.
In our model, monetizing deficits is found to be remarkably powerful. First, a large
dose of monetization might allow avoiding, whenever present, BGP indeterminacy. Sec-
ond, monetization always allows increasing economic growth and welfare along the (high)
BGP, by weakening the debt burden in the long-run. Third, monetization provides ratio-
nale for deficits in the long-run: for high degrees of monetization, the impact of deficits
and debts on economic growth and welfare becomes positive in the steady-state. Al-
though at odds with most findings in the theoretical literature that ignores money fi-
nancing, this result is consistent with empirical work exhibiting a non-linear relationship
between debt or deficits, and economic growth.
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Appendix A: Solution of Household’s program.
The representative Household maximizes (1) subject to (2)-(3)-(4), k0 and b0 given,
and the transversality condition: lim
t→∞
(
exp
(
−
∞∫
0
rsds
)
(kt + bt + mt)
)
= 0. Since in-
vestment is subject to transaction costs, it is convenient to replace the budget constraint
(3) by two constraints on two state variables: at ≡ mt + bt and kt, using the definition
of net investment: k˙t = zt − δkt. Thus, we can write the current Hamiltonian as
Hc = u (ct) + λ1t [rtbt + (1− τ) yt − ct − zt − πtmt] + λ2t (zt − δkt) a
+μt (at − bt −mt) + χt
(
mt − φcct − φkzt
)
,
where λ1t and λ2t are the co-state variables associated with at and kt, respectively, and
χt is the co-state variable associated with the static constraint. First-order conditions
(hereafter FOC) are
/bt μt/λ1t = rt, (A.1)
/ct uc (ct) = λ1t + φcχt = λ1t (1 + φcRt) , (A.2)
/mt − λ1tπt − μt + χt = 0 ⇒ χt/λ1t = πt + μt/λ1t = Rt, (A.3)
/zt − λ1t + λ2t − φkχt = 0 ⇔ λ2t
λ1t
= 1 +
χt
λ1t
φk = 1 + φkRt, (A.4)
/at λ˙1t/λ1t = ρ− rt, (A.5)
/kt λ˙2t/λ2t = ρ + δ − (1− τ) fkλ1t
λ2t
= ρ + δ − (1− τ) fk
1 + φkRt
. (A.6)
FOCs have a standard interpretation. λ1 is the shadow price (i.e. the opportunity
cost) of financial wealth (at), which differs from the shadow price of capital (λ2) in
(A.4), if investment expenditures are subject to the CIA constraint (namely if φk > 0).
Effectively, in this case, wealth cannot directly buy capital, because the latter must be
acquired with money: the opportunity cost of capital is higher than the opportunity cost
of wealth, as soon as φk > 0. If capital is not subject to the CIA constraint, this feature
disappears, and λ1t = λ2t. Similarly, in (A.2), the marginal utility of consumption
has to be distinguished from the shadow price of financial wealth, since wealth cannot
directly buy consumption goods. The opportunity cost of money for consumption (φcRt)
introduces a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal value
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of wealth. Equation (A.3) states that the marginal cost of money (the nominal interest
rate Rt) must equalize its marginal return (the marginal value of a unit of money in the
CIA constraint relative to the marginal value of wealth χt/λ1t). Finally, equations (A.5)
and (A.6) describe the evolution of shadow prices of wealth and capital, respectively.
They show, in particular, that the marginal return of capital (its marginal productivity
net from taxes and depreciation (1 − τ) fk (.) − δ) differs from the marginal return of
bonds (the real interest rate rt), as soon as the CIA constraint affects capital goods.
By differentiating (A.2) and (A.4) and after some simple manipulations we obtain
equations (9) and (10) of the main text.
Appendix B: The reduced form of the model with a CIA constraint on con-
sumption only.
With a CIA constraint on consumption goods, we have: m = φcc, which implies m˙ =
φcc˙, and, since money emissions are proportional to the deficit (m˙ + πm = φc (c˙ + πc) = ηd),
we obtain: c˙/c = ηdφc − π. Besides, c˙k/ck = c˙/c− γk, hence, with π = R− r
c˙k
ck
=
ηdk
φcck
− (γk − r + R) , (B.1)
which is the second equation of the reduced-form (32). From the Keynes-Ramsey rule
(9), we have
c˙k
ck
= S
[
r − ρ− φ
cR˙
1 + φcR
]
− γk. (B.2)
Thus, we obtain the path of the nominal interest rate from (B.1) and (B.2)
R˙ =
(
1 + φcR
φc
)[
r (gk)− ρ− 1
S
(
ηdk
φcck
+ r (gk)−R
)]
, (B.3)
which is the first equation of the reduced-form (32). The definition of the deficit rule (6)
provides the fourth equation of the reduced form
d˙y = −μ (dy − θ) . (B.4)
Finally, in Government’s budget constraint (5), the deficit is defined as: dt = rtbt +
gt − τyt. Deflating both sides by the capital stock, and using the definition of the real
interest rate (29), it comes
bk =
dk + τAg1−αk − gk
(1− τ) αAg1−αk − δ
.
By differentiating this relation, we have
b˙k =
d˙k +
[
[τ − α (1− τ) bk] (1− α) Ag−αk − 1
]
g˙k
r
. (B.5)
Since, from (8)
b˙k = (1− η) dk − γkbk, (B.6)
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and using (B.5) and (B.6), we obtain the third equation of the reduced form (32)
g˙k =
{
r [(1− η) dk − γkbk] + μ
(
dk − θAg1−αk
)
[τ − α (1− τ) bk] (1− α) Ag1−αk − gk + (1− α) dk
}
gk. (B.7)
We get (32) by replacing dk with dyAg1−αk .
Appendix C: The reduced form with a CIA constraint on consumption and
investment.
When the CIA constraint affects both consumption and investment
(
φk > 0
)
, the
behavior of the nominal interest rate directly results from (10)
R˙ =
1
φk
[
(r + δ)
(
1 + φkR
)− (1− τ) αAg1−αk ] , (C.1)
which constitutes the third equation of the reduced form (40).
Then, the path of the consumption ratio (the fourth equation of the reduced-form
(40)), is still defined by the Keynes-Ramsey rule (B.2), and the law of motion of the
deficit ratio (the first equation of (40)) is still obtained in equation (B.4). The second
equation of the reduced form is the evolution of the public debt ratio (B.6), and we just
have to find the path of the public spending ratio gk.
To this end, we rewrite the CIA constraint (4) as: mk =
(
φc − φk) ck+φk (Ag1−αk − gk).
It follows that: m˙k =
(
φc − φk) c˙k + φk [A (1− α) g−αk − 1] g˙k and, since m˙kmk = η dkmk −
π − γk,
g˙k =
ηdk − (γk + π) mk −
(
φc − φk) c˙k
φkz (gk)
, (C.2)
which corresponds to the last equation of the reduced form (40).
Appendix D: Local stability with the CIA constraint on consumption only.
Define gˆi ≡ (1− α) A (g∗ik )−α > 0 , xˆi ≡ [θ + τ − α (1− τ) b∗ik ] gˆi−1 = − [α + (1−α)δb∗ikg∗ik ] <
0 and φˆi ≡ (1 + φcR∗i) /Sφc > 0, and notice that, from (30): ∂bk∂dy ∣∣∣∗i = y∗ik /r∗i and
∂bk
∂gk
∣∣∣
∗i
= xˆi/r∗i. The Jacobian matrix of system (32) is
Ji1 =

−μ 0 0 0
GDi GGi 0 r∗ib∗ik /xˆ
i
−ηφˆiy∗ik
φcc∗ik
RGi φˆi
ηθφˆiy∗ik
φc(c∗ik )
2
ηy∗ik
φc CG
i −c∗ik c∗ik − γ∗i + r∗i −R∗i
 , (D.1)
where
GGi ≡ ∂g˙k
∂gk
∣∣∣∣
∗i
= −γ∗i+{(1− τ) αgˆi [(1− η) θyi∗k − γi∗b∗ik ]− r∗i [(gˆi − 1) b∗ik + (1− η) θgˆi]} /xˆi,
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GDi ≡ ∂g˙k
∂dy
∣∣∣∣
∗i
=
[
(1− η) r∗i + μ− γ∗i] y∗ik /xˆi,
RGi ≡ ∂R˙
∂gk
∣∣∣∣∣
∗i
= φˆigˆi
[
α (1− τ) (S − 1)− ηθ
φcc∗ik
]
,
CGi ≡ ∂c˙k
∂gk
∣∣∣∣
∗i
=
ηθgˆi
φc
+
[
1− (1− α (1− τ)) gˆi] c∗ik .
It follows that, for “small” deficit values (θ → 0)
Jh1 =

−μ 0 0 0
GDh −γB 0 0
−ηφˆhy∗hk
φcc∗hk
RGh φˆh 0
ηy∗hk
φc CG
h −c∗hk c∗hk
 . (D.2)
Thus the “Barro” BGP is saddle-path stable, with the associated eigenvalues equal
to: −μ < 0, −γB < 0, φˆh > 0 and c∗hk > 0. Regarding the low BGP, the Jacobian matrix
is
Jl1 =

−μ 0 0 0
[(1− η) ρ + μ] y∗lk /xˆl
(
1− gˆl) ρb∗lk /xˆl 0 ρb∗lk /xˆl
−ηφˆly∗lk
φcc∗lk
α (1− τ) (S − 1) φˆlgˆl φˆl 0
ηy∗lk
φc
[
1− (1− α (1− τ)) gˆl] c∗lk −c∗lk c∗lk
 , (D.3)
and
det
(
Jl1
)
= −μρφˆ
lc∗lk b
∗l
k
xˆl
det
 1− gˆl 0 1(1− τ) α (S − 1) gˆl 1 0
1− (1− α (1− τ)) gˆl −1 1
 = αμ (1− τ) Sρφˆlgˆl
xˆl
c∗lk b
∗l
k .
Since xˆl < 0, det
(
Jl1
)
< 0. Yet, one eigenvalue is equal to −μ. Thus, among the
three remaining eigenvalues, we can have either 0 or 2 negative eigenvalues. Let us prove
that the latter case is impossible. The characteristic equation of Jl1 is det
(
Jl1 − λI
)
=
(λ + μ) P (λ) = 0, where P (λ) is the following polynomial of degree three: P (λ) =
λ3 − Bλ2 + Cλ + D, where D ≡ α(1−τ)Sρb∗lk φˆlgˆlc∗lk
xˆl
< 0, B ≡ (1− gˆl) ρb∗lk
xˆl
+ c∗lk + φˆ
l > 0
and C ≡ φˆl
[(
1− gˆl) ρb∗lk
xˆl
+ c∗lk
]
− α (1− τ) gˆlc∗lk ρb
∗l
k
xˆl
> 0, on the sufficient (unnecessary)
condition that gˆl > 1, namely that g∗lk < [(1− α) A]1/α.
Notice first that P ′ (λ) = 0 for λˆ1,2 = 16
[
2B ±√4B2 − 12C], namely for at least one
positive value of λ (say λˆ1 = 16
[
2B +
√
4B2 − 12C] > 0). Therefore, the case of two
negative eigenvalues can arise only in two configurations, as show the following Figures:
if D < 0 and P ′ (0) = C < 0 or if D > 0 and P ′ (0) = C > 0. Consequently, the case
D < 0 and C > 0 corresponds to zero negative eigenvalues.
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Figure D.1: Sign of eigenvalues
Appendix E: Local stability with the CIA constraint on consumption and
investment.
The Jacobian matrix of system (40) is
Ji2 =

− μ 0 0 0 0
(1− η) yi∗k −γ∗i 0 bi∗k BGi
RDi RBi r∗i + δ 0 RGi
CDi CBi CRi ci∗k CG
i
GDi GBi GRi GCi GGi
 .
We first define: zi ≡ gˆi−1, and the derivatives of r in (42) as: rdi ≡ ∂r∂dy
∣∣∣
∗i
= y∗ik /b
∗i
k ,
rgi ≡ ∂r∂gk
∣∣∣
∗i
=
[
(θ + τ) gˆi − 1] /b∗ik and rbi ≡ ∂r∂bk ∣∣∣∗i = −r∗i/b∗ik = [g∗ik − (θ + τ) y∗ik ] / (b∗ik )2.
It follows that:
BGi ≡ ∂b˙k∂gk
∣∣∣
∗i
= (1− η) θgˆi − zib∗ik ,
RDi ≡ ∂R˙∂dy
∣∣∣
∗i
= rdi
(
1+φkR∗i
φk
)
, RBi ≡ ∂R˙
∂b∗ik
∣∣∣
∗i
= rbi
(
1+φkR∗i
φk
)
,
RGi ≡ ∂R˙
∂g∗ik
∣∣∣
∗i
=
[
rgi
(
1 + φR∗i
)− α (1− τ) gˆi] /φk,
CDi ≡ ∂c˙k∂dy
∣∣∣
∗i
=
[
rdi −
(
φcRDi
1+φcR∗i
)]
Sc∗ik , CB
i ≡ ∂c˙k
∂b∗ik
∣∣∣
∗i
=
[
rbi −
(
φcRBi
1+φcR∗i
)]
Sc∗ik ,
CRi ≡ ∂c˙k∂R
∣∣
∗i = −
Sc∗ik (r∗i+δ)φc
(1+φcR∗i) ,
CGi ≡ ∂c˙k∂gk
∣∣∣
∗i
=
[
rgi − φcRGi1+φcR∗i
]
Sc∗ik − zic∗ik ,
GDi ≡ ∂g˙k∂dy
∣∣∣
∗i
=
(
ηy∗ik + rd
im∗ik −
(
φc − φk)CDi) /φkzi,
GBi ≡ ∂g˙k∂bk
∣∣∣
∗i
=
(
rbim∗ik −
(
φc − φk)CBi) /φkzi,
GRi ≡ ∂g˙k∂R
∣∣∣
∗i
= − (m∗ik + (φc − φk)CRi) /φkzi,
GCi ≡ ∂g˙k∂ck
∣∣∣
∗i
=
(
m∗ik +
(
r∗i − γ∗i −R∗i − CCi) (φc − φk)) /φkzi,
GGi ≡ ∂g˙k∂gk
∣∣∣
∗i
= r∗i − γ∗i −R∗i + (ηθgˆi − (zi − rgi)m∗ik − (φc − φk)CGi) /φkzi.
To establish formal results, we study the local dynamics of the two BGPs for “small”
deficit values (θ → 0), namely in the neighborhood of the “Barro” BGP and of the
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“Solow” BGP, respectively. In addition, to simplify calculations, we consider that φk =
φc = φ > 0.
Let us first analyze the dynamics in the neighborhood of the high BGP. For “small”
deficit values (θ → 0), the Jacobian matrix becomes
Jh2 =

−μ 0 0 0 0
(1− η) yh∗k −γB 0 0 0
RDh RBh r∗h + δ 0 RGh
0 0 CRh ch∗k CG
h
GDh GBh GRh GCh GGh
 .
Thus, Jh2 has two negative eigenvalues, namely λ1 = −μ and λ2 = −γB . Furthermore:
det
(
Jh2
)
= −μγ
B(y∗hk −g∗hk )
zh
det
 r∗h + δ 0 RGhCRh ch∗k CGh
1 − 1 zh − rgh
, thus it changes
sign as zh changes sign. Consequently, Jh2 has at least 3 negative eigenvalues, when
det
(
Jh2
)
< 0, and the high BGP is undetermined. By continuity, this property is verified
for positive (but low) deficit values. This proves point (ii) of Proposition 6.
Now, let us focus on the dynamics in the neighborhood of the low BGP. For “small”
deficit values (θ → 0), the Jacobian matrix becomes
Jl2 =

−μ 0 0 0 0
(1− η) yl∗k 0 0 bSk −zlbSk
RDl −ρ
bSk
(
1+φρ
φ
)
ρ + δ 0 RGl
0 0 CRl cl∗k CG
l
GDl ρ
bSk
(
y∗lk −g∗lk
zi
)
GRl GCl GGl
 .
The characteristic equation of this matrix is
Det
(
Jl2 − λI
)
= − (λ + μ) Det (A− λI) = 0,
where
A =

0 0 bSk −zlbSk
−ρ
bSk
(
1+φρ
φ
)
ρ + δ 0 RGl
0 CRl cl∗k CG
l
ρ
bSk
(
y∗lk −g∗lk
zi
)
GRl GCl GGl
 .
Thus, one eigenvalue is equal to λ1 = −μ < 0. In addition, observe that
Det (A− λI) = −Det

ρ
bSk
(
1+φρ
φ
)
− λ λ− ρ − δ b˜Sk −RGl − zlbSk
−ρ
bSk
(
1+φρ
φ
)
ρ + δ − λ 0 RGl
0 CRl − λ + cl∗k CGl
ρ
bSk
(
y∗lk −g∗lk
zi
)
GRl GCl − λ + GGl

.
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Since ρ/b∗lk ∼= 0, we can rewrite
Det (A− λI) ∼=
(
λ− ρ
bSk
(
1 + φρ
φ
))
Det (B− λI) ,
where
B =
 ρ + δ 0 RGlCRl c∗lk CGl
GRl GCl GGl
 .
Therefore, another eigenvalue is equal to λ2 ∼= ρbSk
(
1+φρ
φ
)
→ 0+. Furthermore
Det (B) =
(
y∗lk − g∗lk
)
zl
c∗lk
{
(ρ + δ) (1− S) rgl + RGl}
and
Tr (B) = ρ + δ + c∗lk −
(
1 + rgl/zl
) (
y∗lk − g∗lk
)
= ρ + rgl
(
y∗lk − g∗lk
)
/zl.
First, notice that rgl =
(
τ gˆl − 1) /bSk > 0, since g∗lk ¿ [τ (1− α) A]α in the neighbor-
hood of the low BGP. It follows that zi ≡ gˆi−1 > 0. Consequently: Tr (B) > 0. Second,
it can be readily verified that RGl < 0; thus Det (B) < 0 on the (unnecessary) sufficient
condition that S ∼= 1, which we suppose. It follows that B has exactly one negative and
two positives eigenvalues, which proves point (i) of Proposition 6.
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